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Abstract: This paper attempts to assess the extent to which a ‘new’ industrial
relations regime has developed in advanced economies over the past two decades
and the prospects of new industrial relations. In addition to examining
developments in the private sector, the paper assesses changes in public sector
industrial relations in the wake of marketization and the vogue of ‘post-
bureaucracy’ principles of ‘new public management’. Th   paper considers three
major scenarios concerning the ‘trajectory’ of industrial relations systems in
advanced economies. The evidence as to current levels of diffusion, combined with
the most plausible scenarios, suggests that a generalized new industrial relations
regime is highly unlikely to develop and that new industrial relations
arrangements will remain at best but one of a series of competing and coexisting
models for regulating relations between employers and unions. We may thus be
witnessing the end of new industrial relations both as a generalizable model and as
paradigm for comprehending change in unionized employment in advanced
economies.
A significant body of recent comparative research has been stimulated in major degree
by the ‘big question’ in the discipline during the past two decades: whether ‘new’
industrial relations arrangements were diffusing ever more widely in response to changes
in the organization of production in advanced economies (Locke et al., 1995; Lane,
1995; Kochan et al., 1997). Taking this question as their starting point, a number of
studies have returned to the classical comparative theme of understanding commonalities
and variations in the experiences of different countries (see especially Locke et l.,
1995). Curiously, in consequence, the big question has receded somewhat into the
background. This paper seeks to bring it into the foreground of discussion by using
comparative and national studies to pose a stark question: are we witnessing the end of
new industrial relations? The paper begins by summarizing the argument that post-
Fordist product strategies and production systems and analogous or related public sector
trends were leading to the demise of ‘adversarial’ industrial relations and to radical
changes in other established models. It then considers a range of studies and reviews
highlighting the limited diffusion of new industrial relations in both the private and public
sectors of advanced Western economies. Finally, the paper considers three scenarios
regarding the trajectories of industrial relations systems, and the place of new industrial
relations arrangements in these scenarios.
Any assessment of new industrial relations has to begin  by admitting that the term is
loose, imprecise and sometimes contested. The term itself is more familiar in the Anglo-
Saxon literature. In writings on developments in continental European industrial
relations systems, other cognate terms are perhaps more commonly found: for example,
‘new production concepts’ (Kern and Schumann, 1984), ‘productivity coalitions’
(Windolf, 1989), ‘a new productivist covenant between capital and labour’ (Rogers and
Streeck, 1995;), ‘co-operative IR/HRM practices’ (Regalia and Regini, 1995) and
‘micro-concertation’ (Regini, 1995: ch. 5).  We use the concept here to encapsulate the
kinds of changes which all such concepts seek to portray: that is, a wide range of
industrial relations and human resource practices, which commentary and research
suggests have become more common during the 1980s and 1990s. These practices,
commonly described as ‘new’ or ‘innovative’, cover the areas of pay, work organization,
employee and trade union ‘voice’ or representative arrangements, recruitment and
selection practices, performance management systems and provisions for the
‘governance’ of firms and workplaces in the most general sense. Many of the practices in
question, for example, forms of direct employee involvement, performance-related pay
or profit sharing, are not confined to unionized firms and appear to have become more
common across the board. Those who write about new industrial relations, however, are
particularly interested in the take up and effects of  innovative practices in unionized
workplaces. Their main concern is how new practices may impact on relationships built
over time mainly on the basis of collective bargaining, but also possibly also on the basis
of works council structures of various kinds. When occurring in combination, or in
‘bundles’, new practices are usually regarded - certainly in the Anglo-Saxon literature -
as the basis of a new model of industrial relations, also variously described as a ‘mutual
gains’, ‘jointist’,  ‘partnership’,  ‘joint governance’ or  ‘joint management’ model.
The literature on trends in industrial relations during the past two decades falls broadly
into a ‘first wave’ of commentary and research during the 1980s, characterized by claims
that a wholesale transformation of prevailing industrial relations and human resource
arrangements was underway, and a ‘second wave’ f  research, concentrated in the
1990s, which is much more cautious and sceptical of the degree to which radical change
has been in evidence. The literature on changes in the public domain falls less eas ly into
this periodization. Here both projections and empirical studies mostly overlap during the
1990s. Each strand of the recent literature is considered in turn.
The Demise of ‘Fordism’ and Adversarial Industrial Relations
The central themes of  much of the post-war industrial relations literature concerned
how developed economies might foster industrial relations arrangements capable of
reconciling their work-forces with the rigours of  industrial control systems;  how  wage
inflation and industrial conflict could be contained through incomes policies or other
concertative arrangements; how ways might be found to ‘humanize’ work to counter, in
particular, the  alienating effects of mass production systems, and how employers and
governments might respond to increasingly assertive trade union demands to extend
‘industrial citizenship’ and promote industrial democracy (Bendix, 1956; Kerr et al.,
1960; Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978; Goldthorpe, 1984).
During the 1980s these themes were eclipsed by a literature urging a new understanding
of the challenges facing advanced economies and offering a new prognosis of the
progress of  industrial relations. In the new literature the pressures of the 1960s and
1970s, especially wage inflation, sluggish economic growth, rising unemployment and
industrial militancy,  were seen as marking out the closing stages of a mode of
production and work organization that had sustained advanced economies for much of
the century: the so-called ‘Fordist’ or mass production model  This model was seen to
anchor the ‘adversarial system’ of industrial relations, based  in most national, cases on
the primacy of  ‘arms-length’ conflictual dealings between management and unions,
‘exclusionary’ forms of management decision-making,  the subjection of  employees to
close control,  and the imposition by unions and employees -  albeit to varying degrees
and in different ways in different national cases - of controls over both the boundaries
between jobs and the pace at which work was performed (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Boyer,
1988; Kochan et al., 1986).
If the economic and industrial relations convulsions of the 1970s were regarded as but
the death-throws of  Fordism and its associated model of industrial relations, the
economic pressures of the 1980s and 1990s were seen as altering both the basis of
competition in advanced economies and the character of industrial relations regimes.
Mass markets for a wide range of standardized goods and services had become
‘saturated’, and besides, developing economies now enjoyed significant relative cost
advantages in the manufacture of mass-produced commodities. Consumer tastes and
preferences in developed economies were becoming increasingly diverse and changeable,
and competitive success would progressively hinge on the capacity of firms to produce
customized products and services for ‘niche’ markets. To  r spond to the ‘new
competition’ firms  now had to compete on the basis of innovation and quality, as well
as, or even more than, on the basis of cost and price. The advent of  flexible
computerized machine tools and allied information technologies provided the
technological and economic basis on which to respond to such market pressures. Trends
in markets as diverse as textiles and fashion goods,  machine tools, consumer electronics
and cars were held to be emblematic of the ‘new competition’ (Piore and Sabel, 1984;
Kern and Schumann, 1984; Womack et al., 1990; Best, 1990).
Combining observation, theoretical reasoning and normative injunction, commentators
on developments in private markets argued that the emerging ‘Post-Fordist’ economy
could only effectively be supported by a model of industrial relations which broke
decisively with the adversarial paradigm, and which deepened  and supplemented
institutions for co-operative management-union engagement, such as works councils,
where these existed. Relations between companies and unions needed to shift from
adversarialism to co-operation, as it was now deemed to be critical for the parties jointly
to address competitive pressures and harness the knowledge, skills and commitment of
the work-force to the imperatives of the ‘new’ competition. These imperatives included
an ongoing acceptance of product and process innovation, a willingness to train and
retrain as specific skills and routines became more ‘perishable’, and joint commitment to
the commercial objectives of the organization as the sole basis on which employment
security and improved pay and conditions could be obtained. Product and process
innovation, the creation and deployment of so-called ‘high and broad’ skills in the work-
force, and employee commitment to commercial objectives, required the creation of new
forms of work organization, such as team working, quality circles, total quality
management programmes and the like, characterized by higher levels of  direct mployee
involvement. Narrow job speclialization was no longer sustainable; nor were union and
employee controls over the ‘effort bargain’ (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Kern and Schumann,
1984; Kochan et al., 1986).
If what were viewed as the imperatives of production systems were the main drivers of
new forms of management-employee and management-union engagement, a range of
associated adjustments in employment arrangements were also predicted. To grant
unions a ‘stake’ in new industrial relations arrangements, as well as to allay fears for
their institutional security, firms in countries without works c ncils arrangements might
develop joint forums, steering groups and other collaborative structures. In other areas
commonly subjected to standardization under the adversarial model, in particular pay
and grading, more flexibility was required to recognize levels of  skill acquisition, to
assign employees to broader grade categories more suited to flatter organizations and to
institute ‘gain sharing’. Areas  like recruitment, promotion and performance
monitoring/management, traditionally subject to unilateral managerial control, or
possibly to formal or informal  joint regulation, would also become subject to co-
operation as both parties recognized the priority now attaching to selecting, developing
and promoting staff with the kinds of technical and behavioural skills required in the new
industrial relations order. In industrial relations systems such as that of Germany, where
many such areas had been removed from the arena of adversarial industrial relations and
made subject to the deliberation of works councils, there would nevertheless be a new
imperative for more decentralized ways of promoting co-operative decision-making at
the level of work groups (Kern and Schumann,  1984). In the German case, no less than
others, the existing balance between collective bargaining and institutions for co-
operative decision-making would change in favour of the latter to support  the growing
prevalence of ‘new production concepts’.
In all these ways, the vision of industrial relations in the post-Fordist firm, as articulated
by a growing number of commentators, differed markedly from the heavily
compromised, tightly regulated and highly proceduralized features of  th   established
‘liberal pluralist’ model of industrial relations widely prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries,
and to varying degrees, in Continental European systems.  The viison of the new
industrial relations differed also from the weakly institutionalized, ‘arms-length collective
bargaining’ of the French system, and from the dual system prevailing in Germany,
where co-operation was channelled through works councils often controlled by unions
and made subject to national-level union policy on pay and  employment conditions. For
commentators such institutional differences were of marginal significance compared with
common imperatives arising from the ‘new production concepts’, ‘lean production’,
‘socio-technical systems’ and ‘World Class Manufacturing’ models which exemplified
both post-Fordist competitive strategies in their most  pronounced or advanced forms
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; Kern and Schumann, 1984; Kochan et al., 1986; Womack et al.,
1990; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994).
The New Public Management
Post-Fordist writings focused in the main on the regulatory and redistributive functions
of the state and had little to say about modes of service delivery or employment relations
in the public sector. Trends in the market sectors of advanced economies appeared to
find parallels in developments in the public sector. The mounting ‘fiscal crisis’ of
governments during the 1970s, rooted in rising income maintenance and other social
spending commitments and declining  fiscal buoyancy, led to  curbs on public spending
and a wide array of reforms in public and social service provision across industrial
nations (OECD, 1990; 1995). Commercial public enterprises in European countries were
not immune to these pressures, and increasingly faced EU-instigated programmes of
deregulation as part of the project of completing the Single Market (Ferner, 1994).
Monopoly  providers of  public utilities,  as well as providers of services hitherto subject
to extensive regulation, now had to countenance competition from private companies
and sometimes from other publicly-owned enterprises, possibly even in other national
jurisdictions. At the same time,  public enterprises  faced increasingly tight  EU-controls
on capital and current financial supports and subsidies from national governments.
Tighter spending controls were also accompanied by an increasingly influential deology
which sought to apply ‘consumerist’ principles to public and social service delivery. First
advocated  by pressure groups, then taken up by governments and increasingly, if not
uncritically, adopted by public service unions as a way of defending the ‘public sphere’,
consumerism sought to enshrine new ‘consumer-centred’ principles in the design and
delivery of public services. The consumerist view of public services, which increasingly
found expression in ‘charters’ of various kinds, argued that principles which were pivotal
to the purchase of  traded goods and services should increasingly provide the paradigm
for public services:  convenient and jargon-free information on service availability; access
to services in places and at times suitable for service ‘consumer’; whenever possible,
‘choice’ as between alternative service providers; a right to redress in the event of the
service provider failing to meet standards of delivery - these and related principles
seemed to herald in the public sectors analogous pressures to those driving customized
or ‘niche’ product strategies in private markets (Potter, 1988; Epstein, 1990; Harrow
and Shaw, 1992; Walsh, 1994).
Prophets of the new public services and the ‘new public management’ envisaged radical
changes in public administration which would alter the face of the public domain
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1993).  The ‘mass’ provision of uniform services to passive and
supplicant ‘clients’, in ways deemed satisfactory to bureaucrats and the professions
involved in service provision, would no longer represent a defensible model of  service
delivery - any more than analogous Fordist strategies would prove sustainable in private
markets. The few commentators who addressed new organizational forms and the
changing public sector labour process from a Post-Fordist perspective viewed such
changes as a reflection of wider Post-Fordist tendencies in advanced economies ( for a
review see Clark and Newman, 1997: 22-5). While the human resource and industrial
relations implications of such developments were ambiguous - the emphasis on
marketization might clearly clash with the underlying logic of new industrial relations -
writers who addressed such issues clearly articulated a new industrial relations paradigm
as the expected outcome of reforms. This was especially apparent in the highly influential
book, Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). It was apparent also in a
succession of OECD studies of the reform process that widely prevalent canons of ‘best
practice’ in human resource management were being employed as yardsticks against
which to judge progress in the public domain (OECD, 1990; 1995; 1996 and see Storey,
1989; Boston et al., 1996).   
Cost containment, consumerism and a new and related vogue in applying management
principles to public service organizations led to major changes in public administration
across virtually all OECD countries from the 1980s. In public service organizations and
commercial public companies - those, that is, that had not been privatized under public
sector reform programmes - the pace and extent of change were in marked contrast to
the stability which had characterized public administration in many countries - war-time
conditions excepted. Quasi-market devices were introduced to engender competition:
‘purchasers’ of services were separated from ‘providers’. Executive public service
‘agencies’ were created and held accountable for the effectiveness with which they
managed service delivery. An array of devices was deployed to manage public service
organizations on the basis of objectives and targets rather than observance of rules and
precedents (OECD, 1995). These developments resulted often in challenges to long-
established models of public service industrial relations and human resource
management. More flexible pay fixing arrangements were advocated to allow
management greater leeway  to respond to regional and occupational pay pressures and
to reward staff for differential performance. Advocates of reform urged that working
practices and job boundaries be made more flexible and that grading systems should be
simplified. Extensive efforts were made to revamp the highly bureaucratic performance
appraisal systems common in many countries in order to create more effective tools for
‘performance management’, based on objective setting, feedback and performance-
linked rewards (OECD, 1990; 1993a; 1993b; 1995; 1996). While the constitutional and
legal provisions commonly governing union representation for public servants appeared
less amenable to radical change, joint management-union decision-making and
‘partnership’ were advocated in countries without works council arrangements in the
public service, for example the US and Canada (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Kearney
and Hayes, 1994; Kernahan, 1993). New paradigms of management, urging similar
innovations,  were also evident in commercial public companies beset by the commercial
pressures unleashed by deregulation and liberalization (Ferner, 1994; Hastings, 1994).
Whether writing about the private or public sectors, the language of much  commentary
on industrial relations change during the 1980s was of ‘transformation’ and systemic
change. Portrayals of supposed underlying changes in patterns of production and service
delivery spoke in terms of ‘divides’ or ‘transitions’. Fordist production systems were
giving way to ‘post-Fordist’. Economies based on  mass production were giving way to
economies based on ‘flexible specialization’ or ‘diversified quality production’. ‘Old’
industrial relations were giving way to ‘new’.
Limits to the Diffusion of New Industrial Relations
This section of the paper considers empi ical  contributions to the literature on change in
industrial relations practices and arrangements during the 1980s and 1990s. It begins
with a short overview of the main themes to emerge from more empirically focused
treatments of the features of new production systems and ‘post-bureaucracy’ models of
public service delivery. It then moves on to consider the evidence which has emerged on
various strands of change in industrial relations practices, and examines developments in
public sectors. A series of conclusions are presented based on the  patter revealed by
the evidence.
A detailed critique of post-Fordist theories of change in markets, regulatory institutions
and production systems is beyond the scope of this study. Criticisms of  the central
arguments associated with the new paradigm have mounted during the 1990s. Both
conceptual objections and empirical evidence have been marshaled against the
apocalyptic predictions of the 1980s ( for a good summary, see Kelly, 1998: ch. 7). The
main trends in production systems, as portrayed by the more critical and empirical
literature, can be summarized briefly. At a conceptual level commentators quickly
required a more extended set of analytical categories to make sense of changes in
patterns of production. Post-Fordism and ‘flexible specialization’ were joined by ‘neo-
Fordism’, involving modest changes in product ranges, accompanied by minor changes
in levels of work discretion. Neo-Fordism was soon being used to reconceptualize ‘lean
production’ or ‘Toyotaism’, in which employees participated in he  elimination of slack
and ‘waste’ in the production process, reduced cycle-times and minimized task
uncertainty (Boyer, 1988; Berggren, 1993; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994;  Kelly, 1998:
110-14). Japanese car manufacturers were portrayed as exemplars of product strategies
involving ‘flexible volume production’, a significantly different production model to
flexible specialization, with different implications for the labour process and industrial
relations (see Berggren, 1993: ch. 1).  The concept ‘Flex-Fordism’ was also used to
describe production models based on small-batches and product customization,
supported by highly skilled groups of workers, whose skills were mainly of  an
unreconstructed craft character (Boyer, 1988, Lane, 1995: ch. 8).
A radical disjuncture in production systems and product strategies, adequately described
in terms of Post-Fordism, could not be substantiated empirically anywhere.
Attempts to portray developments in public services delivery in post-Fordist terms were
also criticized for grossly simplifying complex and contradictory tendencies (Clarke and
Newman, 1997: 22-5). The issue of  what links there might be between newer forms of
production and employment practices increasingly came to be viewed as one which
permitted choices mediated by institutional arrangements in different countries and even
different regions within countries. How radically industrial relations might change in the
context of newer forms of production depended on such choices, and little was pre-
ordained by either technology or competitive strategy (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994;
Berggren, 1992; Regini, 1995).  Notwithstanding such severe qualifications to the early
Post-Fordist thesis, data on trends in skill levels in the work-force, where available,
confirmed one of the core predictions of the Post-Fordism thesis. The skill content of
jobs in both manufacturing and services has indeed risen significantly over the past two
decades, and workers across a wide industrial front now exercised more discretion at
work (for data on the UK, see Gallie et al., 1998; for the US see Cappelli et al., 1997:
ch. 5, and for Germany, see Lane, 1995: 155-6). The issue of what specific link there
might be between higher levels of skill and discretion and wider ‘new’ industrial relations
arrangements again quickly became empirically problematic, as will be seen below.
Empirical reviews of the innovations in service provision associated with the new public
management also concluded that the depth and extent of change varied across countries,
as well as across services within countries, and was heavily mediated by pre-existing
institutional traditions and arrangements (Ferner, 1994; OECD, 1995; 1996; Farnham et
al., 1996; Lane and Wolf, 1996). The general trend was towards a more extensive
reliance on quasi-market mechanisms to shape service delivery, but within this trend, the
UK and New Zealand clearly emerged as ‘outliers’. A key role had been assigned in the
literature on  consumerism to ‘newly empowered’ public servants, flexible multi-
disciplinary teams of professionals and to other similar innovations involving qualitative
changes in the public service labour process. The reform process, however, emphasized
centrally-driven considerations of cost containment and efficiency, which all but
swamped consumerist and other ‘qualitative’ priorities. The greater the degree to which
cost and efficiency were emphasized - as borne out in particular by the UK and New
Zealand case - the more qualitative service priorities were crowded out (OECD, 1995;
1996; Boston et al., 1996). Cost considerations, however, dominated what the OECD
described as the ‘integration of  people into public service reform’ just as they had
dominated the reform process more generally (OECD, 1996).  The picture of public
service provision emerging at the close of the 1990s differs significantly from the dual
attainment of enhanced efficiency and greater consumer responsiveness that provided the
guiding premise of  ‘post-bureaucracy’ theories of new public services such as that
outlined in Reinventing Government.  The picture of public service workers that
emerged in cases where reform had been driven furthest suggested that the most
significant qualitative changes in the public service labour process involved the
demoralization of  public servants (see Boston et al., 1996 for a discussion of New
Zealand and Lane and Wolf, 1990 for a discussion of the US. These themes are almost
ubiquitous in the UK empirical literature).
Piecemeal Change in Practices and Compound Employer Strategies
Research during the 1990s has contributed to a more balanced and sober understanding
of the changes wrought in the sphere of employment by new competitive forces. The
level and pace of diffusion of industrial relations and human resource practices
associated with the new industrial relations have emerged as considerably lower than
predicted in the ‘first wave’ of  writing considered above.  Research now more
commonly emphasizes that much of the change which has occured is piecemeal, ad hoc,
fragile and marked as much by continuities with older industrial relations and human
resource regimes than by disjunctures (Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Pfeffer, 1994;
Regini, 1995; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Scott, 1994; Millward, 1994; Ichniowski et
al., 1996; Roche and Kochan, 1996; Sisson, 1997; Roche, 1999).
The often piecemeal and ad hoc character of  change in industrial relations and human
resource practices is particularly significant because research has consistently shown that
what matters for behaviour and performance in firms is the implementation of consistent
‘bundles’ of industrial relations and human resource practices (Arthur, 1992; Appelbaum
and Batt, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Sisson, 1997).  Judging from
the international evidence, in particular the evidence for Anglo-Saxon countries,  but
also available evidence for Continental European countries, innovation involving
consistent  bundles of new practices has been  very uncommon. Thus Regini in an
analysis of changing industrial relations in European companies argued that the change
process was dominated by what he termed ‘pragmatic eclecticism’ rather than
comprehensive programmes aimed at reconstructing industrial relations in the face of
new competitive pressures (Regini, 1995: ch. 7). The valedictory volume of the
Industrial Democracy in Europe (IDE) Research Group, felt the need to emphasize the
absence still in the 1990s of a ‘holistic’ or ‘systemic’ approach to participation, involving
a combination of direct and participative approaches, supported by complimentary
human resource policies (Heller et al., 1998: ch. 8). Overall, levels of participation
appeared little different to what they had been when the IDE group had begun its
empirical research in the late 1970s. Still in the 1990s the group judged the prospects for
‘democratic practices’ in organizations to be ‘somewhat limited (Heller et al., 1998:
186). Even in Scandinavian countries, which had been associated with some of the most
radical concepts in participation - following the so-called ‘socio-technical’ model -  the
evidence was of slow and uncertain diffusion of organizational democracy, with
commentators equally despondent as to the outlook for new approaches to work
organization and related forms of participation (Heller et al., 1998: 180-6).
Only in the German case are commentators generally in agreement were new production
concepts, involving team work and direct involvement, often successfully implanted into
an employment model which already possessed a German form of many of the features
central to Anglo-Saxon models of new industrial relations: high levels of skills, a strong
commitment to vocational training, representative participation through works councils
and co-determination, internal career paths and a high degree of employment security
(Lane, 1995: 134-9). But even in the German case, Post-Fordist forms of work
organization have affected only a ‘large minority’ of manufacturing workers (Lane,
1995: 155, emphasis added). Moreover, German research began to emphasize that even
works councils operated differently across sectors, and might even be suppressed or
contained by employers, depending on a range of contingent factors (Thelen, 1991;
Royle, 1998). Though some UK researchers have tried to argue on the basis of statistical
modelling exercises that firms’ choices of  sets of new practices were more coherent than
hitherto believed, the empirical data on which this arguments was based suggested that
the incidence of  models resembling ‘high commitment management’ or ‘high
performance work systems’ remained extremely modest (Wood and Albanese, 1995;
Wood and de Menzes, 1998). Where coherent or systematic models have been adopted
in manufacturing industries, the ‘lean production’ or ‘Toyota model’, which accords
limited discretion to employees and limited influence to unions,  have predominated over
so-called ‘socio-technical’ models, where employees enjoy higher levels of discretion  in
organizing and managing their work and unions exert greater influence (Berggren, 1993;
Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Grattan, 1997; Sisson, 1997).
In part the limited diffusion of new industrial relations and human resource practices
reflect the continuing diversity in developed economies in the competitive postures of
firms. Cost-based and value-added competitive strategies coexist in complex patterns.
Firms sometimes move serially between alternative strategies in response to specific sets
of challenges or constraints. Sometimes they pursue both strategies simultaneously in
different business divisions, or different plants. Sometimes competitive postures may
seek to incorporate elements of  both strategies, or to seek a via media between the
rigours of each one (Walton et al., 1994; Locke et al, 1995: ch. 12). To the degree that
new industrial relations arrangements are more suited to ‘value-added’ strategies and
adversarialism to ‘cost-based strategies’, such complex strategic postures by firms may
confound simple typologies of industrial relations practices. A further complication
introduced by empirical research is the preference of  significant numbers of firms to
engage in compound or ‘mixed’ industrial relations and human resource strategies.
These can involve a limited and pragmatic willingness to countenance partnership or
mutual gains arrangements, allied to a preference, wherever possible, to ‘suppress’ or
limit union influence, or to practise  ‘union substitution’ (Kochan et al., 1986; Cooke,
1990; Guest, 1995; Roche and Turner, 1998).
In the United Kingdom ‘new industrial relations’ became associated during the 1980s
with a general willingness by unions to adopt more ‘co-operative postures’ towards
management and sometimes more specifically with a bundle of industrial relations and
human resource practices which included single-union recognition agreements,  full
operational flexibility, no-strike clauses, ‘pendulum’ or other forms of binding
arbitration, flat organizational hierarchies, incorporating simple grading systems and
representative company councils. Practices such as these found their locus classicus n
the UK plants of Japanese multinationals (Basset, 1986; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1989;
Millward, 1994; Kelly, 1996). Their overall incidence, however, was insignificant
(Millward, 1994). Empirical studies of exemplars of such arrangements sought to show
that they amounted to exercises in shallow pseudo-participation, marked by union
weakness and marginalization (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992). Other case-based studies
of a wider spectrum of  new industrial relations practices and models showed that even
well-intentioned ‘inclusionary’ initiatives were marked by considerable managerial
ambivalence, incorporated elements of ‘old’ and new industrial relations, fell short of
expectations and had little real impact on  attitudes and behaviour (Scott, 1994). A
survey of  firms affiliated to the Involvement and Participation Association, and thus
likely to be untypically committed to workplace partnership, revealed that less than half
saw a necessary role for unions in ‘successful partnership organizations’. Many of the
practices associated with partnership and new industrial relations in normative models
were present to variable and often modest degrees, in particular flexible job design
practices, employment security guarantees and financial participation (Guest and Peccei,
1997).   Small wonder that UK survey research could point to little evidence of any
major change in employee attitudes to employers: they continued, in the main, to be
characterized by low trust (Kelly and Kelly, 1991). Nor is it surprising that UK research
reveals low levels of ‘organizational commitment’ on the part of employees (Gallie et al.,
1998: ch. 9).
Direct Involvement and  Representative Participation
New industrial relations models assigned importance to the achievement of so-called
‘functional flexibility’, that is, flexible work practices, cross-training, mobility between
jobs and related arrangements.  A range of studies confirm that work flexibility has been
one of the most pervasive trends of the 1980s and 1990s (Locke et al., 1995; Brewster
et al., 1994: ch. 11; Kochan and Osterman, 1994: ch. 4; Lane, 1995; Sisson, 1997).
What marked out the new industrial relations paradigm, however, was the view that
decentralized production strategies might be expected to lead to a fusion of  direct
employee involvement and representative channels for participation. Developments in
‘voice’ arrangements  have been dominated everywhere by the growing incidence of
forms of direct employee involvement based on widening task discretion, team work,
task and project groups, quality circles, total quality management programmes, new
approaches to  communication, and similar voice arrangements (Appelbaum and Batt,
1994; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Hyman and Mason, 1995; Knudsen, 1995).
Commentators differ as to the consequences of this development for collective forms of
participation and, in particular, for trade union representation. Some commentators
stress that the growth of direct employee involvement has been at the expense of
collective channels for employee and union participation. In the case of the UK and the
US, Hyman and Mason (1995: ch. 10) argue that the usage of collective involvement-
oriented joint consultation declined during the 1990s and that ‘participative collective
bargaining’ in both countries was becoming increasingly circumscribed by direct
involvement techniques. This was the case in spite of the informal ad hoc nature of much
employee involvement activity and, relatedly, the often indifferent effects of employee
involvement initiatives on behaviour and  performance (Hyman and Mason, 1995: 187-
89).
 Hyman and Mason clearly intend their generalization regarding to the growth of direct
involvement at the expense of  collective forms of participation to apply to Continental
Europe, as well as the UK and the US. Knudsen, however, advances a more cautious
argument noting that whereas the development of representative participation was
almost at a complete standstill since the 1980s, while direct involvement had grown
significantly, there existed no strong evidence in European countries generally that direct
forms of participation were aimed at replacing or weakening indirect participation and
union influence (Knudsen, 1995: ch. 9). Recent reviews of developments in France,
however,  also suggest that employers have indeed been disposed to bypass and
marginalize weak and divided trade unions through the use of  forms of direct employee
involvement (see Tchobanian, 1995; Streeck, 1995; Lane, 1995: ch. 7).
For Knudsen, the German and Danish cases pointed to the way in which direct and
representative participation could coexist and provide mutual reinforcement (Knudsen,
1995: 160). Streeck and Rogers’ major study of works council systems during the 1980s
and 1990s reaches a broadly similar conclusion. The general pattern in Continental
Europe, they argued,  pointed to signs of a ‘ possible renaissance of councils as a
workplace-based infrastructure of productive co-operation alongside institutionalized
conflict’ (Streeck and Rogers, 1995: 19; see also Streeck, 1995). Direct forms of
employee involvement had indeed grown in importance in more or less all countries, and
many works councils had first resisted this development, as well as the advent of human
resource management more generally, as a threat to their regulatory authority. With
exception of France, where unions were weak and divided and employers particularly
hostile, and of  Spain, where unions were under acute pressure to defend their members
against widespread rationalization, the trend was towards coexistence between direct
and representative participation - the former increasingly integrated with the latter. The
evidence prompted Streeck and Rogers to point - albeit very tentatively - towards the
possibility of a ‘ broad if silent movement in the industrial relations of advanced capitalist
countries towards a new productivist covenant between capital and labour’ (Rogers and
Streeck, 1995: 20).
Most analysts agree, however, that the UK and US cases, where no general provisions
for representative participation are enshrined by legislation or collective agreements,
show a major growth in forms of  direct involvement which either bypass unions, seek to
undermine, collective bargaining, or provide a means of promoting ‘union substitution’
In both countries, the incidence of mutual gains or partnership arrangements, which seek
to integrate involvement and representative participation, remains modest (see Cooke,
1990; Rogers, 1995; Hyman and Mason, 1995; Gallie et al., 1998: ch. 4). Though it has
become common of late to view Ireland as an examplar of Post-Fordist transformation
(Sabel, 1996; McCartney and Teague, 1998), the picture there is broadly comparable
with other Anglo-Saxon countries. Direct employee involvement is widespread in
unionized workplaces, but the incidence of partnership-based approaches, in which
unions participate in the handling of change issues, is modest. A recent workplace survey
revealed that no more than one in twenty companies favoured partnership to handle any
aspect of  workplace change during the 1990s. For most areas of change involving
operational concerns the incidence of partnership is lower. Partnership rarely extends to
strategic aspects of plant or company decision-making (Roche and Geary, 1998). The
most widely prevalent pattern in Ireland appears to be the growing use of various forms
of direct employee involvement accompanied by little concern for how these might be
linked with collective representation (see Roche and Kochan, 1996; Roche, 1998)..
The continuing decline in trade union density and influence across most of the advanced
economies of  Western Europe, North American, Australia and New Zealand,  appears
to have had ambiguous effects on the uptake of partnership arrangements. On the one
hand, declining membership and density have acted as a catalyst for union engagement
with new industrial relations practices in countries like the US, the UK and Ireland
(Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Ackers and Payne, 1998; Roche and Turner, 1998). On
the other hand,  in the case of the US, writers have pointed to a vicious circle of
weakening trade union power, more aggressive employer attempts to resist or
marginalize unions and more highly adversarial industrial relations (see Rogers, 1995;
Roche and Kochan, 1996: 55-7). If union power is in decline employers may also be
faced with strategic dilemmas at the micro-level and the macro. At the micro-level, the
key issue may become why partnership arrangements should be concluded with unions, if
the option presents itself of bypassing union channels and emphasizing direct employee
involvement. It is clear certainly from the UK evidence and also from data on Ireland
that ‘dualistic’ strategies, focusing on innovations in areas under direct management
control, while side-stepping trade unions and collective bargaining, are common (Storey,
1992; Roche and Kochan, 1996; Hyman and Mason, 1995; Roche and Geary, 1998). At
the macro-level, employer federations may also be faced with the dilemma as to whether
they should support initiatives by the state, or enshrined in law or collective agreements,
that might foster the reconstruction of industrial relations, or  alternatively whether they
should allow current trends to continue unabated in anticipation of further union decline.
In the United States,  the deadlock surrounding the proposals of the ‘Dunlop
Commission’ on industrial relations illustrates that employers - and governments
concerned to accommodate employer opinion - may prefer to underwrite the status quo
than to take risks by supporting new institutional arrangements for union-management
co-operation (Rogers, 1995). In the case of Ireland, the posture of the main employers’
confederation reveals a similar disposition to avoid giving hostages to fortune by
emphatically backing  union-management partnership at the workplace in compliance
with the provisions on partnership and involvement contained in  the current tripartite
national agreement (see Gunnigle, 1998; Roche, 1998; Roche and Geary, 1998).
In Australia and New Zealand such dilemmas have scarcely arisen. The radical neo-
liberalism of  New Zealand governments since the 1980s questioned the very existence
of unions, rendering redundant, certainly for public policy, but apparently also for
employers generally, the issue of accommodating unions in new industrial relations
arrangements (Bray and Walsh, 1998; Boston et al., 1996). In Australia during the
greater part of the 1980s the climate facing unions was more benign under the neo-
corporatist pact between the government and the labour movement. The support
provided under central wage accords for co-operative industrial relations at
establishment level was seen by Australian and other commentators as a particularly
notable development (Lansbury and Niland, 1995; Locke and Kochan, 1995). From the
late 1980s, however, when co-operative arrangements at workplace level ‘remained
sporadic’ (Lansbury and Niland, 1995: 87), Australia lunged towards neo-liberalism, and
the state introduced provisions for ending unions’ representative monopoly. While
unions have managed to hold their ground to a greater degree than in New Zealand,
neither public policy nor employer priorities any longer focus on seeking new ways of
accommodating trade unions (Bray and Walsh, 1998).
Pay Regimes and Employment Security
Pay regimes internationally have generally been subject to decentralization in response to
more intense international competition and employers’ search for flexibility (Katz, 1993).
This tendency has been far from linear, however, and centralized national or sectoral-
level bargaining arrangements remain important in a number of countries (Hyman, 1994;
Ferner and Hyman, 1998).  Less ambiguous has been a general shift towards what has
been described as the ‘decollectivization of pay’: a shift in the weight of pay
determination towards the establishment, growing  pay variability within establishments
and the increased incidence of individual-level pay determination (Filella and Hegewisch,
1994). Research suggests, however, that much innovation in reward systems has more
commonly been piecemeal in character rather than integral to more systematic multi-
stranded change programmes (see Appelbaum and Batt, 1994: ch.5; Kessler, 1995;
Hyman and Mason, 1995: ch. 6).
It is in the area of so-called ‘numerical flexibility’, the extent to which firms relate their
demand for labour to short-term production needs, or alternatively commit themselves to
policies emphasizing employment security, that new industrial relations strikes a very
distinctive pose and appears most discordant with the weight of empirical evidence on
the practices of firms. The first wave of commentary on new industrial relations and
associated normative models ws heavily influenced by the ‘employment stabilization’
policies practised in the case of ‘core workers’ by a number of companies regarded as
exemplars of new industrial relations (Dyer et al., 1985; Kochan et al., 1986). Leaving
aside the continuing growth of  part-time, temporary and contract employment,
regarding which new industrial relations had little to say, research during the 1990s
suggests that firms appear more commonly to be softening or abandoning employment
stabilization policies for established full-time workers, and relying to a greater extent on
external rather than internal labour markets to fill positions across a wide spectrum of
occupational categories and layers of management (Cappelli, 1995; Osterman, 1996;
Locke et al., 1995; Cappelli et al., 1997). Survey data on new industrial relations and
human resource practices suggest that employment  stablilization or assurance policies
are not commonly associated with other features of new industrial relations models or
high commitment management (Osterman, 1994; Wood and Albanese, 1995; McCartney
and Teague, 1998; Wood and de Menzes, 1998).
Recruitment and Selection Practices
While commentators on new industrial relations argued that more flexible, skill-intensive
and ‘empowered’ work systems would lead firms to adopt more sophisticated
recruitment and selection practices, the overriding picture emerging from European
research on recruitment and selection is the continuing dominance of long-established -
and ‘low validity’ -  practices, particularly in the case of manual workers where change
was expected to be most pronounced (Dany and Torchy, 1994). The behavioural
attributes of recruits while relevant to prospective employers (see Cappelli et al., 1997:
ch. 5) are seldom of major significance in recruitment decisions, even, it appears, in
employment  settings where jobs are becoming more complex  (for data on the US, see
Osterman, 1995, and for UK data, see Penn et al., 1993). The importance of this finding
is magnified by data for the UK which show that ‘social skills’,  particularly skills
required to ‘work with people’, are now particularly significant across a range of
industries and services (Gallie et al., 1998: 50-5). UK survey data suggest that
organizations in the public and private sectors commonly view ‘social skills’ and ‘team
working skills’ as  important selection criteria (see Wood and Albanese, 1995; Wood
and de Menzes, 1988). However, survey questions which seek evidence of the incidence
of specific selection practices designed to ‘filter’ recruits systematically on the basis of
such skills present a different picture. The preliminary results of the 1998 UK Workplace
Employee Relations Survey, for example, report that only 20 per cent of establishments
utilize attitudinal tests before making appointments (Cully et al., 1998: 10).  Survey data
for Ireland reveal a similar picture (Heraty and Morley, 1998).  Windolf and Wood’s
case studies of recruitment and selection practices in large German and UK companies
show that managers are indeed concerned to reproduce the ‘social relations’ of the
company and to that end take account of the attitudes of prospective recruits. They do
so, however,  through largely informal ‘filtering’ processes (Windolf and Wood, 1988).
Such an ‘intuitive’ approach is far removed from the formal, detailed and rigorous
selection and socialization practices associated with the new industrial relations (see
Wickens, 1987; Townley, 1989;  Pascale, 1985; Berggren, 1992: 37-9; Kochan and
Osterman, 1994; Pfeffer, 1994: 33-4; Graham, 1995). Also relvant, is recent research on
team working in European countries which shows that discretion to select team members
- one indicator of advanced forms of team work - is seldom accorded to existing
members of  teams (Sisson, 1997). The same holds for the United States (Berggren,
1992; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994).
Marketized Public Sectors and Human Resource Priorities
The picture emerging from recent research on the public sectors of advanced economies
is consistent with empirical work on developments in the private sector. It has proven
difficult in practice to develop and implement coherent strategies for human resource
management and industrial relations (OECD, 1996). This sometimes reflects political
ambiguity and vacillation over reform proposals and  legal complications over the status
of new organizational forms (for illustrations from the UK, see Corby, 1993/94, and
Bach and Winchester, 1994).  In commercial  public enterprises, the complexity of the
process of strategy formulation has also been emphasized, including the permeability of
political decision-making above the level of  the enterprise to lobbying and obstruction
tactics by unions and management (Ferner, 1988).  Organizational strategies which are
politically mediated and open to political challenge appear  highly susceptible to abrupt
changes of  tempo, or even of direction, to inconsistent interventions by governments
and to the dilution of politically risky change programmes. A strategic context such as
this poses major and perhaps quite distinctive problems for industrial relations and
human resource strategies and their champions in the public domain (Ferner, 1988;
Hastings, 1994; Bach, 1994/95; Bach and Winchester, 1994).
In the UK and New Zealand, where radical reforms to institute quasi-market measures
and introduce public executive public service agencies have proceeded furthest, much of
the work of human resource managers has been bogged down in handling
rationalization, cost-cutting and head-count reduction (Bach, 1994/5; Boston et al.,
1996). The more constructive objectives associated with new models have been
displaced or muted by the effects of  radical organizational change, especially the effects
on employee morale. In the UK research as shown that human resource managers in
health service trusts are viewed by line managers as least effective in the newer and more
strategic areas of their remit (Bach, 1994/95). As in the private sector, the general trend
in public service pay determination has been towards decentralization. Greater ‘pay
flexibility’ has been instituted through such measures as department and agency-level pay
fixing, devolved administrative budgets, greater scope for regional pay variation, and the
use of pay supplements to recruit and retain scarce staff categories (OECD, 1993a).
Performance-related pay, in particular, has been widely adopted in public enterprises and
agencies, but the weight of evidence indicates that it has largely proven ineffective in
improving motivation and performance, and that it is not viewed by public sector
workers as of major significance as a source of employment satisfaction (OECD, 1993b;
1997; Marsden and Richardson, 1994; Marsden and French, 1998). Attempts to promote
total quality management and related approaches to service delivery and to achieve
greater flexibility in work organization court resistance by powerful occupational and
professional groups and their unions, intent on rigorously policing the boundaries of their
jobs, and often dismissive of the consumerist principles animating change programmes
(see Epstein, 1990; Clarke and Newman, 1997: ch.6). Often, it appears, cost constraints
have in any case forced public service agencies to ‘re-profile’ work by transferring tasks
previously performed by skilled groups to unskilled and semi-skilled workers and by
increasing  numbers of  lower-skilled workers (Bach and Winchester, 1994; Bach,
1994/5).
Reviews of  developments in voice arrangements in European public sectors point mainly
to the development of more formalized collective bargaining arrangements and
associated modes of dispute resolution.  Few significant changes have been observed in
the operation of public service works councils in countries where they exist (Treu, 1987;
Ferner, 1993).  Newly created civil service agencies in the UK appear either to have
maintained the status quo with respect to employee voice, or to have attempted to
bypass unions through ‘dualist’ approaches emphasizing direct employee involvement
(Corby, 1993/94; 1998). Partnership arrangements hardly figure at all in reviews of the
new public service agencies. Essentially the same picture holds for national health service
trusts (Bach and Winchester, 1994; Bach, 1994/95; Corby, 1996).  Reviews of
developments in local government point to a small number of experiments in new
bargaining arrangements, such as ‘single-table’ bargaining and the adoption of
‘pendulum arbitration’ for clerical and administrative grades by a handful of local
authorities. But overall the picture is one of  little change in voice arrangements
(Jackson, et al., 1993).
In the United States,  the concern of the first Clinton administration to control the scale
and cost of the federal government led in 1993 to proposals by Vice-President Gore to
‘reinvent’ government. ‘Partnership’ is one of a series of innovations proposed to
promote higher quality, more responsive and more cost effective federal services. A
1993 executive order by President Clinton aimed to clear the way towards partnership-
based collective bargaining in federal agencies. The prospects of new arrangements
replacing entrenched adversarial bargaining structures have yet to be determined  (see
Suntrup and Barnum, 1997). A survey of partnership-based arrangements in  state and
local government indicated that a higher incidence of such arrangements existed in the
mid 1990s than in the private sector. Public sector workers, however, were only half as
likely as private sector workers to view such programmes as effective, and only 20 per
cent rated existing participation mechanisms as ‘very effective’ in improving productivity
or quality (US Department of Labor, 1996: ch. 3;  and see also Balliet, 1997).
While some changes in recruitment and selection practices are reported in the literature,
on the whole the main changes in these areas appear to have involved  the administrative
devolution to departments and agencies of  a higher level of discretion to adopt their
own recruitment programmes rather than having to avail of the services of centralized
civil service commissions or similar bodies. Otherwise little appears to have changed
with respect to how public servants are selected or ‘socialized’, or with respect to the
role of behavioural or qualitative concerns in public service performance  management
systems (see OECD, 1996 for a review of relevant changes and see Marsden and French,
1998 for an analysis of the residual role of qualitative factors in UK public service
performance management systems).
The Future of New Industrial Relations
The results emerging from the ‘second wave’ of literature on new industrial relations
during the 1990s can be summarized in brief before considering alternative arguments as
to the future of industrial relations systems in advanced economies.
1. Extensive experimentation with new industrial relations and human resource practices
has been evident in many countries and in both private and public sectors.  Much of
the change, however, has been piecemeal, fragile and ad hoc, less focused on
instituting a coherent alternative to the adversarial model than on responding to
specific challenges in a largely pragmatic way. German manufacturing industry may
be exceptional in the degree to which new production concepts have fused with the
pre-existing dual model and its associated bundle of employment practices. Generally,
where coherent models have been developed, they have mainly been of a type which
both curtails the discretion available to employees to organize their work and restricts
the decision-making role of trade unions. Where work has been upskilled and task
discretion expanded, employees may still enjoy only very limited participation in
wider aspects of employment and organizational decision-making (Berggren, 1992;
Appelbaum and Batt, 1994;  Gallie et al., 1998). So even the link posited by Post-
Fordism between higher levels of skill or task discretion and new forms of
participation has been called into question by the empirical evidence. Policies of
employment security for core workers, viewed from the outset of the debate -
certainly in Anglo-Saxon countries - as a pillar of new industrial relations
arrangements, seem commonly to be unforthcoming or inoperable. In public sector
organizations coherent sets of innovations have proven at least as difficult to institute
as in the private sector. The widespread adoption of performance-related pay has not
led to the results expected. The market-oriented reforms associated with
managerialism and consumerism and their human resource and industrial relations
effects have often led to the prioritization of cost-cutting and rationalization at the
expense of more constructive  HRM and industrial relations objectives. New forms of
public service delivery, in which marketization and qualitative changes focused on the
consumer are mutually reinforcing, have yet to emerge on any widespread basis.
Public service employment appears in most countries to have become less secure for
progressively larger numbers of public service workers.
2. The competitive postures of employers, their production systems and industrial
relations strategies continue to be highly variable and often harbour compound and
even incompatible objectives. The flexible product and production strategies  widely
seen to provide a platform for the development of new forms of industrial relations
are variably present in all economies, but nowhere represent a dominant new
economic model. (Cutler et al., 1987; Locke and Kochan, 1995; Lane, 1995).
3. In the light of these and other findings, the emphasis in the first wave of literature on
‘transformation’ is misplaced and misleading. The cumulative weight of innovations
do not add up to a generalized alternative to the adversarial model or other ‘Fordist’
models.  New industrial relations have not displaced ‘old’ in a generalized
transformative process driven by economic pressures and new systems of production
and service delivery.
 
 But what of the future of  new industrial relations practices and arrangement? Do the
empirical developments reviewed point to the beginnings of new industrial relations or
do they suggest the end of the paradigm as a generalized model for advanced
economies?  Could developments over the past decade plausibly still be viewed as
reflecting a period of transition to a new industrial relations regime  - a longer and more
difficult transition than anticipated, perhaps, but one in which the end in sight is still
broadly in conformance with the ‘first-wave’ literature?  Alternatively, might generalized
experimentation with new industrial relations and human resource practices have peaked
and might the future involve increasingly diverse industrial relations models and
arrangements? To consider these questions it is necessary to turn to recent reflection and
debate on comparative industrial relations trends. A number of distinct, if overlapping,
arguments can be identified and will be considered in turn.
New Industrial Relations Through Grand Programmes of Institutional
Redesign?
In the light of empirical trends in the US, commentators have argued that nothing short
of a major programme of institutional change, incorporating reforms to industrial
relations structures, education and training, corporate governance arrangements and
other key areas, will be required if  quality-focused competitive strategies, supported by
a new industrial relations regime, are to become embedded in the US economy (Kochan
and Osterman, 1994: chs. 7-9; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994: chs. 9-10; Pfeffer, 1994: chs.
9-10; 1998: ch. 9; Rogers, 1995). Understandably, little optimism exists among these
commentators that such a programme is at all likely to be implemented. The pessimism
of contributors to a symposium on the ‘Dunlop Report’, published in Indu trial
Relations (34(3), 1995), was revealing as to the low morale of liberal commentators
concerning the prospects for change in industrial relations institutions (see, in particular,
Kochan, 1995).
The emphasis of US commentators on the redesign of institutions as a prerequisite for
new industrial relations finds resonance with the EU ’social project’ of creating a
European industrial relations system by harmonizing representative and other
arrangements across Community countries, particularly along the lines of the German
model of industrial relations. The EU programme continues to have some momentum,
most recently leading to the establishment of ‘European works councils’ in companies
with plants in two or more members states. Commission proposals on new forms of
work organization are also heavily permeated by the language of ‘partnership’
(European Commission, 1997). From its inception, however, the progress of the EU
social project in the industrial relations sphere has been very modest, and commentators
have argued that the grand strategy of creating a ‘European industrial relations system’
is all but dead (see Streeck, 1992; 1994). Scenarios that point to major programmes of
institutional change as a prerequisite or coexistence-requisite for the institutionalization
of new industrial relations thus seem unlikely to come to pass on either side of the
Atlantic.
Inter-regime Competition and the Generalized Demise of New Industrial Relations
?
A second perspective associated  in particular with the work of Streeck has been
influenced by both the failure of  competitive trends in advanced economies  to institute
a new industrial relations regime and the implausibility of supposing that such a regime
will emerge through grand programmes of institutional change. Streeck has argued that
European industrial relations systems can be expected to diverge, as significant
differences between countries and regions in labour cost, productivity, levels of
education and skill, and degrees of labour market protection, prompt governments to
realign national and possibly regional industrial relations regimes to fit with broader
competitive postures and opportunities. Programmes of realignment, which would
involve attempts to engender higher levels of consistency between various labour market
and industrial relations policies,  might, in turn, be expected to engender ‘regime
competition’ and ‘bidding wars’ between public authorities, as they struggled to attract
and retain foreign direct investment  (Streeck, 1992). The outcome will be increased
variation in industrial relations arrangements between European nations and possibly
between sub-national regions. Such an outcome represents only a first phase in Streeck’s
favoured scenario. The possibilities available to employers to engage in ‘regime
shopping’ and to defect, or threaten to defect, from industrial relations regimes
characterized by strong representative institutions and extensive labour market
protection, could be expected to result in a progressive erosion of more exacting
employment standards and regulatory arrangements. Streeck’s bleak long-run scenario is
the progressive demise within Europe of  industrial relations regimes closest to the vision
associated with new industrial relations.
Streeck is emphatic that the co-operative industrial relations arrangements which exist in
many works councils systems, could only have arisen and can only survive by being
buttressed by legislation or national agreements between employers and unions (Streeck,
1992; Streeck, 1995; Rogers and Streeck, 1995). Voluntary forms of management-union
co-operation, he argues, are rendered chronically unstable by the possibility that
management might choose to defect in response to short-term pressures. As such, the
dilution of  existing institutional supports to co-operation between employers and
unions, which is likely to be engendered by ‘regime competition’, can only have
damaging consequences for ‘collaborative production’ (Streeck, 1992).
Regime Fragmentation and the Contingent Adoption of New Industrial Relations?
A third perspective resembles Streeck’s scenario, but shorn of its bleak long-run
prediction concerning the generalized emise of  regimes premised on new industrial
relations principles. In this perspective new industrial relations models of different types
are expected to remain significant in advanced economies, but in highly contingent
circumstances and  nowhere as a generalized model of employment relations.
 Locke (1992) and Darbyshire and Katz (1997)  have argued that distinctive national
industrial relations systems may be disappearing in the face of a trend towards wider
variation within countries with respect to models of employment than between models
characteristic of each country. This scenario, aptly described by Darbyshire and Katz as
‘converging divergence’, points to a steady state in which sharply diverging models will
coexist at firm and establishment level within nations. The Darbyshire-Katz scenario was
initially informed by a study of industrial relations trends internationally in
telecommunications (Katz, 1997). Reviewing developments in industrial relations more
generally in Australia, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Japan, Darbyshire and Katz  find increasing variation in employment practices across
a number of industries in all cases. They also identify four generic workplace industrial
relations models which represent commonalities in the nature of  the variation that is
now appearing in all these countries. A ‘low-wage pattern’ is based on managerial
discretion, a strongly anti-union animus, hierarchical work relations, procedural
informality, low wages and high turnover. A ‘HRM pattern’ involves an emphasis on the
creation and maintenance of a corporate culture, supported by extensive communication
practices, the use of  teams subject to management direction, high pay with heavily
individualized rewards and career paths and union substitution. A ‘Japanese-oriented
pattern’  involves problem solving teams, standardized procedures, high pay linked to
seniority and performance appraisals, employment stablization practices, and enterprise
unions. Finally, a ‘joint team-based pattern’  involves joint decision-making,
incorporating unions and embracing semi-autonomous work groups,  high pay and
contingent reward systems and an emphasis on career development (Darbyshire and
Katz, 1997). Whether these generic models are an adequate representation of the range
of variation is not a concern of this paper. It may be a misatake, however, to suppose
that strongly marketized models of industrial relations are restricted to ‘low wage’
employments (see especially Cappelli, 1995). It is clear, nevertheless, that the joint team-
based pattern and, perhaps, the Japanese-oriented pattern come closest to new industrial
relations arrangements as understood in the wider literature.
The adoption of these patterns by firms and establishments reflects differing assessments
of the most effective way to respond to competitive imperatives and pre-existing
constraints and opportunities at local level. The relative incidence of the patterns, in
particular the relative incidence of arrangements based on new industrial relations
principles and their detailed articulation in practice, vary significantly across the
countries studied. The pattern of variation - lowest in Germany, highest in the UK and
the US -  reflect in major degree what Hyman has called the ‘institutional inertia’
engendered by pre-existing national systems of collective bargaining, interest
representation and politics (cf. Hyman, 1994: 20).
 Darbyshire and Katz are emphatic that firms in the countries studied firms are not
observed to be ‘striving for a single ‘best practice’ model of work organization’
(Darbyshire and Katz, 1997: 4). Nor do they propose that any secular trend exists such
as might favour any model(s) of employment over others in the long-term. The future is
one in which diverse employment models will continue to coexist. This position also
implies the end of new industrial relations as a generalized paradigm for advanced
economies, but the continuing currency of new industrial relations in contingent
competitive and organizational conditions. More significant for the subject of this paper
than the differences between the Streeck scenario and the scenario of regime
fragmentation is their common prediction that new industrial relations principles are
highly unlikely to become the basis for a generalized employment regime in advanced
economies.
Conclusion
An influential body of literature during the 1980s predicted the growing diffusion or
generalization of new industrial relations arrangements as a consequence of Post-Fordist
production strategies and post-bureaucratic forms of public management. This paper has
examined a significant and diverse empirical and review literatur  which accumulated
mostly during the 19990s and covered more detailed aspects of change in industrial
relations and human resource practices in firms and public sector organizations. The
weight of the empirical evidence now to hand calls into serious question the extent to
which new industrial relations arrangements have come into being in advanced
economies.  Moreover,  the most convincing scenarios as to the likely trajectory of
industrial relations in advanced economies suggest that the slow and uneven
development of new practices in most countries cannot be attributed to a prolonged
phase of ‘transition’. While differing in important respects, the Streeck and Darbyshire-
Katz scenarios both predict that new industrial relations will not become the basis of a
generalized employment paradigm.
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